The GERD dispute could set a blueprint for China-US collaboration by Khorrami, Nima
Nima Khorrami May 18th, 2021
The GERD dispute could set a blueprint for China-US
collaboration
1 comment | 17 shares
Estimated reading time: 4 minutes
A deadlock in negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam needs a swift and peaceful resolution
to prevent outright con ict in the Horn. This requires the active
engagement of the US and China, says Nima Khorrami, both countries
that could be convinced to adopt a more hands-on approach by
highlighting the dispute’s relevance to their broader strategic agenda of
tackling climate change collaboratively.
Yet another round of talks between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan has failed to break
the deadlock over the disputed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) with
each side blaming the other for the lack of progress. The only notable outcome,
perhaps, is Egypt’s outreach to Russia, even though it is hard to see how Moscow
can make any meaningful contribution. Sure, Russia has been seeking to re-
establish itself in the Horn, and indeed the wider African continent, but it simply
lacks the resources and networks to be able to encourage the disputing parties
to mend their differences. In all likelihood, it will use its involvement in the talks
as a bargaining card in its fast deteriorating relations with the West.
The only good news, notwithstanding their rhetorical statements, is that none of
the countries involved yet have an interest in escalating the situation to the point
of an actual con ict. Still, the prospect of a con ict cannot be discounted if the
disputing trio and the international community fail to change course. Put
otherwise, for there to be a peaceful and/or diplomatic end to the current tussle,
two things are needed: political will to compromise and meaningful involvement
of the United States and China.
With regards to the former, the problem is that the leadership of the two main
parties – Egypt and Ethiopia – are not in a position to make any compromise.
Putting aside the economic interests of each side, Ahmed and Sisi are
constrained by domestic political considerations in these talks. For President
Sisi, it is the future of the military’s role and place in Egyptian politics that is at
stake. Given the centrality of controlling Nile to Egyptian identity, Sisi, a former
general, could end up jeopardising the military’s prospects for retaining its place
in the country’s political life if he is seen as the President under whose watch
Cairo loses control over the Nile. For Ahmed, who is facing a reelection contest in
June 2021, it is simply unfeasible to make concessions on an issue so closely
tied to the Ethiopians sense of national pride at a time when he has waged a war
on a segment of the Ethiopian population in the name of national unity and
nationalism.
Added to this is the lax attitude of China and the US towards the dispute. This
matters a great deal because only Beijing and Washington have the clout and
resources to convince Addis Ababa and Cairo to make painful compromises. Yet
they both seem reluctant mainly because neither can afford being seen as taking
side as they both attach signi cant strategic value to their partnerships with
Egypt and Ethiopia. As such, they have con ned their responses to the issuance
of general statements calling for a diplomatic solution.
A key question, therefore, is how to convince the two superpowers to commit
themselves to the peaceful resolution of this lingering dispute.
Given their lack of strategic sway, one possible solution is for the African Union,
the EU and the United Nations (UN) to change tack and play an indirect role in
resolving the current tensions between Addis, Cairo and Khartoum – one that
concentrates on convincing China and the US of the need for a more hands-on
approach by highlighting the bene ts of such undertaking for Beijing and
Washington’s own bilateral relations. Not only can China and the US use the dam
dispute to test their ability to cooperate when their interests merge but, more
importantly, they can utilise it as a benchmark for resolving similar
disagreements in the years ahead. What is more, doing so would complement
their grander strategic objective of tackling climate change collaboratively.
Labelling climate change a ‘crisis multiplier’ in his latest address to the UN
Security Council, Secretary-General António Guterres highlighted how water
scarcity and food insecurity are likely to trigger bloody con icts and mass
migration in the years ahead. As global temperatures rise, management of
transboundary resources will likely dominate political and/or national security
agendas of countries in environmentally distressed regions including Africa,
Central Asia and the greater Middle East. As early as 2002, for example, Crisis
Group has been warning about the potential of competition over water in Central
Asia where ‘an annual cycle of disputes has developed between the three
downstream’. In the Middle East, Iran and Afghanistan could soon  nd
themselves locked in a heated dispute over the sharing of the Helmand River. In
the so-called Fertile Crescent, similarly, ensuing political struggles over the
control and/or sharing of Tigris and Euphrates, which are fast dissipating, are on
the horizon.
As the world’s largest economies, Beijing and Washington will have stakes in
such con icts. Thus, they have much to gain if they make use of the current
disagreement over GERD to establish a mechanism for addressing and/or
resolving disagreements over the management of scarce transboundary
resources. This is so because that procedure can then be relied on to resolve
similar situations in the future and avert the outbreak of environmentally-induced
con icts both between and within states.
As Ethiopia approaches its election, the winner of that contest – most probably
Ahmed – will be better positioned to make di cult compromises on the dam
provided that the right incentives are on the table. Hence, there is still time to
stave off a potential military con ict in the strategically important Horn. Should
the international community, and in particular the United States and China,
continue on their current path, however, a military con ict cannot be ruled out –
one that will endanger Chinese investment in the Horn, trigger a new wave of
mass migration into the EU and provide extremist groups with a pool of new
recruits and ample space to carry out attacks against US interests in the region
and beyond.
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